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Abstract 
Contrary to the popular notion that money that is easily earned, is also easily spent, economic 
theory holds that income is fungible. Drawing on the concept of mental accounting, this study 
theoretically explores when such a link between spending behaviour and the effort dispensed 
in obtaining income is plausible. Empirically, it is found that the marginal propensity to 
consume from unearned income is about three times larger than that from earned income, 
based on household panel data from rural China, with the difference more pronounced when 
unearned income is transitory and smaller than earned income. The policy implications are 
real.  
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1 Spending and the origins of income 
Folk wisdom holds that income that is easily earned, is also easily spent. This notion is as 
powerful as it is simple, has resonated throughout the world‟s cultures, and is deeply 
embedded in their languages—„easy come, easy go‟ (English), „Как нажито, так и прожито‟ 
(Russian), „lai de rong yi, qu de kuai‟ (Chinese).1 Yet, a central behavioural assumption of 
economic theory is that income is fungible. In this view, consumption behaviour does not 
depend on how income has been obtained, but only on the total amount.2 In technical terms, 
the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is independent of the source of income. So, can 
centuries old folk wisdom be relegated to the realm of anomalies, fascinating, but 
inconsequential? Or does it necessitate querying the standard economic models and their 
policy recommendations?  
 
Following the pioneering work by Thaler (1985, 1990), the fungibility assumption is 
increasingly challenged by behavioural economists. Building on insights from cognitive 
psychology, it is argued that people compartmentalize their income into different mental 
accounts and decide on their consumption within each of these accounts. This creates a direct 
link between spending behaviour and the source of income and is in sharp contrast to the 
standard consumption model, where consumption decisions are integrated into one single 
optimization problem, and income is in effect treated as fungible. But the mere existence of 
mental accounts would be inconsequential if people were not bound by them in practice. If 
the desire to spend from each mental account would not exceed its balance, income would 
remain fungible at the margin, even though consumption would be in line with their mental 
accounts on average. The source of income would not be seen to affect their spending or 
saving behaviour.  
 
Ever since Friedman (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) developed their canonical 
permanent income and lifecycle hypothesis (PIH/LC) there has been a rich empirical 
literature exploring consumption and saving behaviour, usually focused on 
consumption/saving out of transfers (particularly windfalls). According to PIH/LC 
households smooth their consumption over time. Their consumption level is thus determined 
by their permanent/anticipated income and independent of their current income, implying a 
large MPC out of permanent/anticipated income and a low MPC out of 
transitory/unanticipated income, rendering transfers/windfalls3 ideal to explore the PIH/LC 
hypothesis.4 Both supportive and results to the contrary have been reported.5 
 
                                                 
1 In other Germanic languages one finds „wie gewonnen, so zerronnen‟ (German), „zo gewonnen, zo geronnen‟ 
(Dutch), in Spanish „lo que llega facil, facil se va‟ and in Amharic, „bekelalu yemta bekalau yehedal‟. 
2 Fungibility is the notion that money has no labels and that all sources of income can be (indistinguishably) 
collapsed in one number. 
3 Examples of the wide range of windfalls explored include lottery prizes, Second World War restitution 
payments, social security payments and tax refunds, bonus payments, annual state transfers, and shopping 
coupons. 
4 However, the smoothing of consumption may break down also in the standard additive utility model when 
households are allowed to engage in precautionary saving or when credit markets are imperfect (Browning and 
Lusardi 1996).  
5 Studies finding support for PIH/LC include Kreinin (1961); Paxson (1992); Browning and Collado (2001), 
while Bodkin (1959); Parker (1999); Souleles (1999); Agarwal et al. (2007); and Hsieh et al. (2010) among 
others, provide evidence to the contrary.   
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Careful reading of this literature suggests however that it is not so much the anticipated 
nature of the windfall that matters, but much more its size; the MPC of windfalls is typically 
higher than that of regular income when it concerns small income gains, and smaller when 
the income gains are relatively large (Landsberger 1966; Keeler et al. 1985; Hsieh 2003; 
Johnson et al. 2006; Milkman and Beshears 2009). Spending out of international and 
domestic remittances in developing countries displays similar patterns—focused on 
consumption goods (food) when they are small compared to regular income, and largely 
devoted to investment goods (education, housing) when they are relatively large (Davies et 
al. 2009; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010a,2010b). In other words, there is empirical support for 
the PIH/LC when it concerns large, but not when it concerns small windfalls or transfers.  
 
In their behavioural lifecycle model Shefrin and Thaler (1981, 1988) accommodate such 
differential MPCs through the introduction of mental accounts. In their view, individuals 
maintain a current income, a current asset, and a future income account. Individuals are 
further posited to classify small transfers into the current income account, which has a high 
MPC, and larger transfers, which feel more like wealth, into the asset account, which has a 
lower MPC. They deploy such mental accounting as a self-control device. It helps them 
maximize their intertemporal utility by reducing the pain (utility loss) of the willpower effort 
needed to overcome the temptation of overindulgence. Another psychological factor that has 
been posited to drive mental accounting, besides self control, includes the need to simplify 
otherwise complex decision problems because of limitations in cognitive capacity (Read et al. 
1999; Hsieh 2003). And an example of mental accounts that has received particular attention 
lately, especially in the context of current (as opposed to intertemporal) consumption 
portfolio allocation, is the „flypaper‟ or „labeling effect‟. In this phenomenon people change 
their consumption behaviour in line with the suggestion of the label.6   
 
In addition to differences in size and anticipation, the windfalls and transfers studied above 
share a third, and largely ignored, feature compared with regular/permanent income, i.e. that 
they are essentially unearned.7 And just like the immediate pain of paying may undermine the 
pleasure derived from consumption—the ticking of the taxi meter reducing the pleasure of 
the ride being an oft quoted example (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998), so may the thought of 
spending hard-earned money induce utility loss and more spending restraint when money is 
earned, compared with when it is obtained as a transfer or windfall. Further inspired by the 
widespread and culturally embedded recognition of such behaviour, it is the coding of income 
in line with the amount of effort dispensed that is the form of mental accounting explored 
here.  
 
A better understanding of whether the amount of dispensed effort affects spending and 
saving/investment behaviour can have important implications for the design of many policy 
interventions. For example, are stimulus packages in times of economic crises aimed at 
providing employment (Trabajar, Argentina) more effective in stimulating demand than 
packages aimed at transferring money to households (China‟s stimulus package in 2008)? 
Similarly, massive redistribution programmes are being developed in many transforming 
countries to stem the growing rural-urban divide. Is it more efficient to do so through 
                                                 
6 Kooreman (2000) finds for example that in the Netherlands the MPC of child clothing out of exogenous child 
benefits is substantially larger than the MPC of child clothing out of other income sources. Similarly, recent 
studies of school feeding (Jacoby 2002) and supplementary nutrition (Islam and Hoddinott 2009) programmes 
find that a substantial part of the supplementary feeding „sticks‟ with the targeted child (like flypaper). Because 
these transfers are inframarginal, parents would be expected to reallocate the transfers away from the child. 
7 Arkes et al. (1994) were among the first to draw attention to this. 
 3 
(unconditional or conditional) transfers (e.g. China, Harmonious Socialist Countryside 
Programme; Brazil, Bolsa Familia) or through employment guarantee schemes as in India? 
At the macro level, the findings may also provide a behavioural interpretation of why aid may 
be less effective in fostering development than say migration or trade (Pack and Pack 1993; 
Wagstaff 2010). They could further bear on the debate about the optimality of different aid 
modalities such as grants, loans as well as the more innovative forms of development finance 
(Odedokun 2003; Girishankar 2009).8  
 
In particular, two questions are addressed in this paper. First, whether earned and unearned 
income are indeed fungible. Second, if not, whether there are plausible grounds to attribute 
this to mental accounting based on effort. The first question is explored within the context of 
intertemporal consumption allocation (as opposed to current consumption or asset portfolio 
choice).9 More specifically, the paper examines whether the marginal propensity to consume 
or save/invest from earned incomes is different from that of unearned incomes controlling for 
other intervening factors such as loans and credit constraints. In doing so, it is also explored 
whether the results are sensitive to the size of the income gain and whether they display 
heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups. To analyse the explanatory power of the mental 
accounting hypothesis, a series of competing hypotheses are reviewed with special attention 
to the implications of the PIH (small MPC from transitory and large MPC from permanent 
income). To do so, the earned and unearned income categories are also separated explicitly 
into their permanent and transitory components.  
 
Unlike most of the savings and mental accounting studies reviewed above, the empirical 
application of this paper is to a lower income and market-based setting; i.e. rural China in the 
early 2000s. To estimate the differences in MPCs from earned and unearned income, 
household fixed effects and time varying village fixed effect panel regression techniques are 
applied to a 5-year household panel of 1,500 rural households from two provinces in western 
China, Gansu and Inner Mongolia. Estimates thus reflect revealed preferences in the market 
place derived from standard household budget surveys, as opposed to stated preferences or 
experimental settings.10 The results indicate that households have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume unearned income and a higher marginal propensity to save/invest 
earned income, with MPC of the former three times larger than that of the latter. These 
tendencies are more pronounced when unearned income is transitory and smaller than earned 
income. They are largely robust to the gender composition of the household, but less 
pronounced among the richer segments of society. Careful consideration of competing 
hypotheses reveals mental accounting based on the effort dispensed in obtaining income as a 
leading contender to understand such behaviour, lending some credence to the age-old saying 
„easy come, easy go‟.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores theoretically how and when mental 
accounting affects consumption behaviour. The empirical strategy is reviewed in section 3, 
followed by a description of the data used in the study in section 4. The core findings, their 
                                                 
8 Nonetheless, while suggestive, care must be taken in interpreting the results in this context. The findings 
presented here concern micro-behaviour at the household level, while the aid debate concerns decision-making 
processes at more aggregate levels such as local or national governments.  
9 See Choi et al. (2009) for an example of mental accounting in asset portfolio choice. 
10 While the latter help greatly in establishing causality, they also require great care in addressing potential 
issues of randomization bias and framing (List 2009). The use of the more widely available, standard panel 
household budget surveys to explore the hypotheses advanced here further facilitates re-examination of these 
hypotheses in other cultural settings. 
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heterogeneity across settings, and their robustness to competing hypotheses are discussed in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 A theoretical account of mental accounting 
2.1 A standard model of intertemporal choice 
Following Browning and Lusardi (1996) a rudimentary two-period model is used to elucidate 
the core implications for intertemporal consumption behaviour of holding mental accounts of 
earned and unearned income.11 To fix ideas the results from the basic intertemporal choice 
model are repeated first. Assume a two-period living household (t=1,2) optimizes 
intertemporal welfare defined over consumption. To do so it deploys an intertemporally 
additive utility function with as instantaneous utility u(c) = ln(c). The household allocates its 
wealth in period 1 between consumption and saving in order to achieve the maximum 
discounted lifetime utility. In period 2, it consumes everything it has. It solves in effect:  
                         (1) 
                    
                           
                        
where    and    are consumption in period 1 and period 2 respectively;    and    are income 
in period 1 and period 2 respectively, and   is saving in period 1. The parameter r represents 
the interest rate and   the discount factor. Solving this model yields:  
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y P which corresponds to the annuity value of the sum of current assets 
(equal to zero in this case) and the discounted present value of future earnings (Deaton 
1997).12 The difference between the income ty  and the permanent income is defined as the 
transitory income ( Pt
T
t yyy  ) which has no effect on current consumption c1.     
  
                                                 
11 While the derived results carry through in a multi-period horizon (T>2), restriction to two periods facilitates 
an explicit analysis of corner solutions when spending from unearned income is not constrained in all periods.  
12 To see this, note that the present discounted value of future income 
r
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  , an increase in permanent income is fully consumed; as a result, an increase in 
transitory income is fully saved,    
  
   
   
   . 
2.2 Intertemporal choice with mental accounting 
When there is some pain associated with spending hard-earned money in a way that it is not 
when spending unearned income, households may mentally put earned and unearned income 
in different accounts, allowing them to evaluate the utilities derived from immediate and 
deferred consumption from earned and unearned income differently. This core cultural and 
psychological insight can be captured by representing the household‟s utility from 
consumption by            (as opposed to     under the fungibility assumption), with    
and    the expenditures from the unearned and earned mental income accounts. The 
parameter λ  (≥1) captures the additional pleasure derived from (or lack of pain associated 
with) spending unearned income (or conversely, the psychological penalty when spending 
earned income). The household‟s optimization challenge now becomes:  
               
      
         
      
        (3) 
              
    
    
    
     
               
    
           
    
   
                 
    
          
    
       
    
     
where   
 ,   
 ,   
 ,   
  are unearned and earned income in periods 1 and 2 respectively.13 
Earned and unearned income are uncorrelated in each period. In each period, unearned 
consumption cannot exceed unearned income, as the utility bonus ( λ ) applies only to 
spending from unearned income. Savings are consumed in the next period. As 
saving/investment requires at a minimum willpower effort to overcome the temptation of 
immediate consumption, saving is considered here as earned income in the next period, and 
its consumption does not yield additional pleasure (and therefore     
    
 ).14 Both 
earned and unearned income in period 1 can be saved, though there is no additional pleasure (
λ ) from spending borrowed money ( uu yc 110  )—as it has to be paid back in the next 
period. Write the corresponding Langrange function to solve (3):  
 
       
      
         
      
        
    
    
    
          
    
  
         
    
        
    
        
    
        (4) 
 
The first order conditions can be derived as:  
 
  
                   
 
  
              (5) 
  
  
        
 
  
      
                                                 
13 Without loss of generality for the core insights obtained in the model, the model abstracts from the possibility 
of zero consumption.  
14 Alternatively, it could be argued that the memory of effort evaporates over time, rendering future 
consumption from savings more similar to consumption from unearned income (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). 
This line of inquiry is abstracted from in the theoretical exposition that follows.  
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Beginning with the interior solution to (3) ( 021  ), it can be derived that: 
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Substitution of (6) into the budget constraints yields:  
  
  
 
     
         
    
       
    
  
          
   
  
  
 
     
         
    
       
    
  
          
 
  
  
  
     
         
    
       
    
  
     
  
  
  
 
     
         
    
       
    
  
     
        (7) 
 
From (7) it can be seen that the marginal propensity to consume from unearned income is the 
same as that from earned income (    
  
    
    
  
   
  
 
   
 which equals     
  
    
    
  
   
  
 
   
 . While households hold mental accounts, they are not binding at the margin. Income is 
fungible (at the margin), just like under the standard intertemporal choice model reviewed 
above, rendering mental accounting inconsequential. If         , consumption in period 
1 and 2 becomes:  
 
      
         
    
       
    
  
       
        (8) 
 
The interior solution to (3) coincides with the PIH: the household consumes permanent 
income and saves transitory income ( 11 
PMPC  and 01 
TMPC  ). 
 
Both earned and unearned income could in principle be permanent or transitory. Equation (8) 
suggests a further division of permanent income into its earned and unearned parts: 
permanent unearned income     
       
    
 
       
 and permanent earned income     
       
    
 
       
 . The marginal propensity to consume out of both of them is equal to one (
11
´
1 
PEPU MPCMPC ). The marginal propensity to consume from unearned transitory 
income (  
       
  ) and earned transitory income (  
       
  ) is then equal to 
zero ( 011 
TETU MPCMPC ). Unearned and earned income are fungible at the margin (have 
equal MPCs) in both their permanent and transitory parts. 
 
If mental accounting in the interior solution is inconsequential, then what happens in the 
corner solutions (when 01   and/or 02  )? Important insights are obtained from 
considering the more extreme case when the households wants to spend all unearned income 
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in each period, i.e.             In this case, all unearned income is used for consumption 
in each period (  
    
    
    
  . As a result, the household‟s consumption decision on 
earned income no longer depends on its unearned income, and it is as if it solves the basic 
model without mental accounting—the only difference being that income is now earned 
income only.15 Optimal consumption is given by:  
 
  
    
    
  
       
    
 
          
   
            (9) 
  
    
    
  
              
    
  
          
  
 
It follows that     
         
  
 
   
    The marginal propensity to consume from 
unearned income exceeds the marginal propensity to consume from earned income—or 
earned and unearned income are no longer fungible and mental accounting binds.  
 
Does this hold across both the permanent and transitory components of earned and unearned 
income, i.e. when one jointly considers both the (un)earned and transitory nature of income? 
Looking at the MPCs of unearned and earned income separately by their permanent and 
transitory components, it is easy to see that both permanent and transitory unearned income 
are fully consumed ( 111 
TUPU MPCMPC ).16 The permanent part of earned income is also 
fully consumed ( 11 
PEMPC ), but not its transitory component which is saved ( 01 
TEMPC ). 
This suggests first that the permanent income parts from earned and unearned income remain 
fungible ( 111 
PEPU MPCMPC ), but not the transitory income parts (
01 11 
TETU MPCMPC ). The fungibility assumption for unearned and earned income 
breaks down for the transitory part of unearned and earned income.17 When the constraint 
only binds in the first period and not in the second period (         ) however, then 
fungibility breaks down for both the permanent and transitory part of unearned and earned 
income (see appendix A1). The findings are summarized in Chart 1. 
 
                                                 
15 To see this, note that the Lagrangean to (3) presented in (4) now becomes the Lagrangean to (1), augmented 
with two constant utility terms from unearned income in periods 1 and 2. 
16 Recalling    
    
        and noting that   
    
      when         , it follows that     
   
    
    
  
    
 
        
       
    
  . The other MPCs can be derived similarly. 
17 As a corollary, the results of (9) also suggest that the PIH only holds for earned income in this case  
1( 1 
PEMPC  > 01 
TEMPC ), but that it breaks down for unearned income, which is fully consumed 
1( 11 
TUPU MPCMPC ). 
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Chart 1: Fungiblity of earned and unearned income breaks down in the corner solution. 
 uMPC1  
eMPC1  Fungibility between earned and unearned 
income 
Interior solution 
               0 
 
   
 
 
   
 Retained 
Corner solutions    
 (1)           1 
 
   
 Breaks down (for transitory part) 
 (2)           1 
 
        
 Breaks down (for both transitory and 
permanent parts) 
 
In sum, in the corner solutions, mental accounting binds and earned and unearned income are 
no longer fungible. This raises the question under which conditions corner solutions are likely 
to occur. To explore this, note that two conditions need to hold in the interior solution: 
 
  
  
 
     
         
    
       
    
  
          
   
         (10) 
  
  
  
     
         
    
       
    
  
     
   
       (10‟) 
 
Focusing on (10), several important insights emerge. First, the larger is the pain associated 
with spending hard-earned income, i.e. the bigger is λ, the less likely it is that the interior 
solution holds, and thus the more likely it is that unearned and earned income are no longer 
fungible, with current unearned income more likely being spent. Given that psychological 
pain associated with spending hard-earned money has been modeled to affect spending 
behaviour, this is obviously no surprise. 
 
Second, the more impatient an individual is (i.e. the smaller the discount factor (β) or the 
larger the discount rate), the more likely fungibility will break down and the more likely the 
MPC from unearned income will exceed this from earned income. Similarly, the lower r (i.e. 
the less investment opportunities a household has) the more likely unearned income will be 
spent more readily than earned income. Holding all else equal, unearned income might thus 
be spent more readily among poorer households (who tend to be more impatient (smaller β) 
and with less investment opportunities (lower r)) than among richer households.  
 
Third, and potentially more striking at first sight, the smaller is current unearned income ( uy1 ) 
compared to current earned income ( ey1 ) or future (earned and unearned) income (  
    
  , 
the more likely the constraint binds. In other words, when current unearned income is small 
compared to current earned income, it is less likely to be fungible, and unearned income is 
more likely to be spent. When unearned income is relatively large on the other hand, mental 
accounting is unlikely to bind at the margin and unearned income is likely spent/saved at a 
similar marginal rate as earned income. Put simply, relatively small transfers are mostly 
spent, while large ones tend to be saved. The importance of the ratio of earned over unearned 
income is reminiscent of the empirical findings regarding the conditions under which the PIH 
holds (invalid for small transfers, valid for large transfers).  
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An empirical strategy is now designed to test (1) whether the MPC does indeed differ 
depending on whether income is earned or not, and if so (2) whether this can be plausibly 
ascribed to mental accounting.  
3 Testing income fungibility in practice 
Beginning with the most rudimentary form, let consumption of household h living in village v 
at time t depend on income in a linear fashion as follows:  
 
,+++= 210 vhtvhtvhtvht eEαUααC        (11) 
where U and E represent the household‟s unearned and earned income respectively and vhte  is 
the error term. When income is fungible, the MPC from unearned income (U) is equal to that 
from the earned income (E) or 21 = αα , providing a straightforward way to test whether 
household spending behaviour depends on the source of income.  
 
Obviously, direct application of (11) to the data is problematic. First, consumption may not 
only depend on income but also on credit and (returns to financial) assets, which are likely 
correlated with income itself. Second, households are located in different villages. Policies, 
facilities and cultural characteristics that are specific to locations may simultaneously affect 
household income and spending. Third, households are different. For example, a household 
with extensive social networks may receive and send out more gifts and transfers than a less 
well-connected household. Such networks are not directly observed in the data. Households 
also have different demographic characteristics, which may affect the composition of their 
income as well as their spending behaviour. 
 
To accommodate these considerations equation (11) is augmented with loans ( vhtL ) taken 
during t, the household‟s financial asset position ( 1-vhtA ) at the beginning of the year t before 
investment returns have been realized, 1-vhtLiv  the value of livestock at the beginning of year 
t, n time varying village dummies represented by jtV , , household fixed effects uvh, and a series 
of time varying household characteristics Hvht,i: 
,
=
,
1=
,
1=
1-51-4321
∑∑ vhtvhjtVj
n
j
ivht
H
i
m
i
vhtvhtvhtvhtvhtvht
euVH
LivALEUC




     (12) 
 
The set of village-year dummies controls for all time invariant and time variant community 
characteristics (including changes in relative prices, project interventions, and the overall 
macro-economic conditions). Time invariant unobserved household heterogeneity (including 
preferences) is controlled for through the inclusion of household dummies, while vhtH  
captures the m most important remaining time variant household characteristics that may also 
affect consumption behaviour (and income).  
 
Equation (12) forms the base equation and it is first estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The theoretical section further delineated a series of circumstances under which 
fungibility between unearned and earned income was more likely to break down. These are 
explored in turn. First, inclusion of household fixed effects in (12) obviously helps protect the 
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estimates against potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity. But it also reduces efficiency, 
and more importantly, it forces identification of the MPCs from transitory income, while 
OLS estimates without household fixed effects identify the MPCs from variations across 
households in both their transitory and permanent income. As indicated in the theoretical 
section, depending on the corner solution the household finds itself in, fungibility may only 
break down for the transitory part of unearned income, and not the permanent part. 
Household fixed effect estimates cannot speak to this.  
 
To explore this further, earned and unearned income are separated into a permanent and a 
transitory part in the spirit of the empirical approaches followed earlier by Keeler et al. 
(1985) and Paxson (1992). In particular, let:  
,++)×(= ∑
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e
vhjj
n
j
vht rvVtηE  ,++)×(= ∑
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u
vht
u
vhjj
n
j
vht rvVtρU          (13) 
where jV  represent village dummies, 
e
vhv  and 
u
vhv  household fixed effects, and 
e
vhtr  and 
u
vhtr  
error terms. Define  
,)(= ∑
1=
e
vhjj
p
j
vht vVtEP            ,=
e
vhtvht rET       (14) 
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vht vVtρUP             ,=
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vhtvht rUT   
where vhtEP  is earned permanent income, vhtET  is earned transitory income, vhtUP  is 
unearned permanent income, and vhtUT  is unearned transitory income. Permanent income is 
the household fixed effect plus a village specific time trend and the difference between 
observed income and estimated permanent income is the transitory income. 
 
Considering that transitory income may be correlated across year, the error terms are modeled 
to follow an AR(1) process: 
,1-
e
vht
e
vht
ee
vht frr          ,1-
u
vht
u
vht
uu
vht frr           (15) 
where evhtf  and 
u
vhtf  are identically independently distributed following normal distributions 
with means equal to zero. The model in equations (13)-(15) is estimated using the 
Generalized Least Squares estimator developed in  Baltagi and Wu (1999). The following 
equation is then estimated to explore the fungibility of consumption/saving from unearned 
and earned income while controlling for the durability of the income gains:  
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

 (16)
 
 
By comparing whether 31´    and whether 42´   it can be tested whether the fungibility 
assumption breaks down for both the permanent and the transitory parts of unearned and 
earned income or only for the latter.
 
 
 
Second, the theory predicts that the MPC of current unearned income is more likely to be 
larger than the MPC of current earned income the smaller the former is compared to the later. 
To explore this, equations (12) and (16) are re-estimated dropping observations where 
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unearned income exceeds earned income. Similarly, equation (10) indicates that differences 
in the MPCs are more likely when current unearned income is small compared with future 
unearned income. Given the limited length of our panel, this notion is tested by interacting 
the income and loan variables with the ratio between current unearned and permanent 
unearned income instead.18 
 
Finally, the earned and unearned income variables are interacted to explore heterogeneity in 
mental accounting activity across different socioeconomic groups. As illustrated in the 
model, compared to the rich the poor may be more impatient and endowed with less 
investment opportunities, making the mental accounts bind quicker at the margin and 
resulting in a higher MPC from unearned income than from earned income. Yet, the poor and 
the rich may also differentiate themselves in other aspects, which also affect the likelihood of 
binding mental accounts (such as the effort devoted to earning money and the relative 
psychological pain felt in spending it as well as the ratio between unearned and earned 
income). It is a priori not clear how a household‟s welfare level affects the fungibility of 
unearned and earned income. Focusing on differences in MPC differences between the richer 
and the poorer parts of the population, the income and loan variables are interacted with an 
indicator variable which takes the value one when a household is in the top 25 income per 
capita percentile, and zero otherwise. Potential gender differences in the MPCs from different 
income sources are explored by interacting the income and loan variables with the ratio of 
female working age household members (between 16-60 years old).  
4 Patterns of income, consumption and investment among rural households in 
China 
The data used were collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of the Government of 
China as part of the monitoring and evaluation system for the World Bank supported Western 
Poverty Reduction Project. The project operated in Inner Mongolia (IM) and Gansu (GS) 
between 1999 and 2004 and supported households in project villages through the provision of 
agricultural loans and rural infrastructure. Fifteen project counties were sampled (eight in 
Inner Mongolia, seven in Gansu) and within each sample county, ten villages were sampled 
in the ratio of six project villages to four non-project villages. Within each sample village, ten 
households were sampled randomly, yielding a sample of 800 households in Inner Mongolia 
and 700 in Gansu. Households were surveyed annually between 1999 and 2004. There was 
no attrition across rounds.  
 
All data on household consumption, income and loans were collected using the daily diary 
method, with the exception of the baseline year 1999, when annual recall was used. To ensure 
comparability in the consumption data, the study is confined to the 2000-04 panel. Data on 
household characteristics, e.g. demography, education, and assets were collected in 
December every year using the recall method.  
 
Income is coded into two categories based on the effort involved in obtaining the income: 
earned income and unearned income. Earned income (E) includes wage income from 
                                                 
18 To see the similarity in spirit, note that (10) can be written as:   
  
 
     
                      
    
   
          
   
  
given that         
     
    . As a result, the larger is 
uPU yy 1 , the more likely the constraint binds, and 
the more likely it is that unearned and earned income are no longer fungible.  
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temporary migration to urban areas, wage income from participating in off-farm wage-
earning activities locally, and income from family business. Farming, forestry, fishery, 
animal husbandry, construction, transportation, restaurant and other services are all 
considered as family business. Unearned income (U) includes remittances19, gifts and other 
transfers. 
 
Most earned income is derived from family businesses (78 per cent in Gansu and 86 per cent 
in Inner Mongolia) (Tables 1 and 2). Less than half of the households have wage income. In 
Gansu wage income from temporary migration is more important than wages earned locally, 
while in Inner Mongolia it is the opposite. In both provinces, households have on average 
between 300 and 400 (1999) Yuan unearned income. Yet, these averages hide a wide range 
of experiences, with about a third of the sample households not receiving any unearned 
income during the survey period, the majority having less unearned income than earned 
income and a small group (1 per cent) having more unearned than earned income (Table 3). 
Among those whose unearned income is strictly positive, but smaller than their earned 
income, it amounts on average to between 5 per cent and 7 per cent of earned income. When 
unearned income exceeds earned income, it is on average twice as large.  
 
Income is mostly spent on consumption, business and investment. In both provinces, the sum 
of consumption, business and investment is very close to total income. The consumption 
measure used in the estimation includes spending on food, clothing, housing, education, 
medicine, transportation, entertainment, liquor and tobacco. The share of food in total 
consumption is 53 per cent in Gansu and 42 per cent in Inner Mongolia, the richer of the two 
provinces. Housing and education are the next biggest ticket items. As spending on housing 
durables and education could be seen as a form of investment/savings, the robustness of the 
results to exclusion of these consumption components is also explored. Finally, the existence 
of reciprocity in gift giving—income received as gift being more likely to be spent as gifts—
has been documented before (Sobel 2005). To explore whether the marginal propensity to 
consume from earned and unearned income differs beyond the potential reciprocity induced 
by gift giving, gifts given are excluded from the overall expenditure measure examined 
here.20  
 
Turning to the control variables (Table 4), in both provinces each year less than 50 per cent of 
the households took loans. In Gansu the average amount of loans is about 8 per cent of the 
average income, and in Inner Mongolia it is 15 per cent. In both provinces, households also 
hold a significant amount of assets (in the form of financial assets and livestock). Together 
they amount on average to 38 per cent and 57 per cent of total income in Gansu and Inner 
Mongolia respectively. Household size and the dependency ratio, the female labour ratio, the 
number of disabled household members as well as the gender, age, and education of the 
household head are included to capture the (evolving) demographic characteristics of the 
household. A control for the household‟s occupation is also included (a business household 
who owns a shop or a factory may be more inclined to invest its income in its business than 
to consume it) as well as whether the household belongs to the rural cadres (which may 
provide them with easier access to transfers).  
                                                 
19 Remittances are sent back by people who are not considered to be household members, while wage income 
from migrants are from household members who have temporarily migrated to work as wage labourers. The 
former involves little or no immediate effort from household members.  Nonetheless, robustness of the results to 
their exclusion is explored. 
20 A higher marginal propensity to spend on gifts from unearned income than from earned income is indeed 
observed in the data. 
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5 The empirics of unearned and earned income fungibility 
5.1 Households consume more from unearned income and invest/save more from 
earned income 
The household fixed effects findings reported in Table 5 (panel 1, columns 1 and 4) suggest 
that the MPC from unearned income is almost three times larger than that from earned 
income. This holds in both provinces.21  This difference is not only statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level, and thus qualitatively important, but also quantitatively substantial and 
consistent with the existence of binding mental accounts according to the earned/unearned 
nature of income. The purported fungibility of unearned and earned income appears not to 
hold among the households in this sample. 
 
While protecting against bias from unobserved household heterogeneity, the within estimates 
implicitly also control for a household‟s permanent income through the inclusion of 
household fixed effects, in essence identifying the estimated coefficients from transitory 
income. This raises the question whether it is only the MPC from transitory unearned income 
that is larger. The OLS estimates (Table 5, columns 2 and 5), which are identified from both 
transitory and permanent income, shed some light on this. The MPC from unearned income is 
still larger than that from earned income, by a factor 1.5.22 Yet, the difference is now smaller 
than when only transitory income is considered (a factor 1.5 compared to 3), suggesting that 
the difference in MPC between unearned and earned income is larger for their transitory than 
their permanent parts. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions which hold that the 
fungibility assumption breaks down for the transitory component in each corner solution, 
while it only breaks down in one of the corner solutions for the permanent component. 
 
Decomposing earned and unearned income in their permanent and transitory components 
respectively (PT columns (3) and (6)) brings out this difference more clearly. An increase in 
transitory unearned income is two and a half to three times more likely to be consumed than 
an increase in transitory earned income. The MPC from permanent unearned income is still 
larger than that from permanent earned income, but the difference is no longer statistically 
significant. When households get a regular unearned income stream, they tend to behave as if 
it is a regular earned income stream. Yet, in this case, unearned income may well make up an 
important part of their income (e.g. people living on a government allowance or remittance 
stream) and as indicated in the model, whether income from different sources is fungible 
depends critically on the ratio of earned to unearned income. 
 
This is investigated in panel 2 of Table 5, which excludes observations where unearned 
income exceeds earned income.23 The estimated MPC of all unearned income components 
increases and the difference between the MPC from unearned and earned transitory income 
now rises to a factor four. The MPC from unearned permanent income also increases, which, 
with the MPC from earned permanent income remaining unaffected, results in a statistically 
significant difference in the MPC from unearned income over earned income of a factor 1.5 
                                                 
21 The estimated MPCs across the different income sources are within the range reported in the 
consumption/saving literature. When combined with the marginal propensities to invest and save (reported in 
Table A1) they approach one, providing confidence in the results. 
22 This is akin to the findings based on cross sectional data by Zhu et al. (2008) who report that the marginal 
propensity to save out of remittances in rural China is only half that out of other sources of income (implying 
that the MPC is twice as large).   
23 There are only few such households (23 and 47 in Gansu and Inner Mongolia respectively, or 0.8 and 1.5 
percent of the sample). 
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in Gansu. The gap in MPC from unearned and earned income also increases to a factor 1.9 in 
Inner Mongolia, though at a p-value of 17 per cent the difference remains statistically 
insignificant. When unearned income exceeds earned income, a larger share of unearned 
income is saved for the next period, reducing the marginal propensity of immediate 
consumption, as predicted by the theory.24  For about 99 per cent of the sample however, the 
MPC from unearned income is substantially larger than the MPC from earned income, more 
so when it concerns unearned transitory income, but plausibly also when unearned income is 
more permanent. 
 
These core results regarding the larger MPC from unearned income are mirrored in a lower 
marginal propensity to invest/save from unearned income and a larger MPI/MPS from earned 
income (Table A2).  This is most clear cut for Inner Mongolia, where the marginal propensity 
to invest or save unearned income is not statistically different from zero. In Gansu however, a 
substantial part of unearned income is also deferred through saving in financial assets. Yet, it 
concerns here also households whose unearned income exceeds their earned income. When 
excluding these 23 observations (Table A1, panel 2), the MPS from unearned income is no 
longer statistically different from zero, and only earned income is invested or saved. It 
furthermore appears that it is permanent earned income that is invested (or spent on inputs in 
the family business), while transitory earned income is saved in more liquid financial assets.  
 
The MPC‟s from loans on total consumption are around 0.19-0.27 (Table 5), slightly higher 
than those from earned income, but well below those from unearned income. However, with 
an MPC of 0.2-0.3 it is clear that many loans are not only taken for investment, but also for 
consumption purposes. This is more the case in Gansu (the poorer of the two provinces), 
where the MPC and the MPI from loans are about the same, than in Inner Mongolia, where 
the MPI from loans is more than twice the MPC from loans. Overall, the estimated results 
reported in Table 5 (and A3) point to a higher MPC for current consumption from unearned 
income and a larger marginal propensity to invest/save (MPI/MPS) from earned income. 
These distinctions are furthermore more pronounced when earned income is larger than 
unearned income as in most of the sample and when income is transitory.  
5.2 Socioeconomic heterogeneity in the fungibility of unearned and earned income 
Does the difference in MPC from earned and unearned income differ depending on how rich 
the household is? Specifications so far have assumed that the MPC is constant across income 
per capita levels. This assumption is tested through the inclusion of interactions between 
income and loans variables and a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a household is 
in the 75
th
 percentile income per capita category or higher (Table 6). The results suggest that 
the MPC from unearned income is substantially larger than that from earned income among 
both the poorer (the bottom 75 per cent) and the richer (top 25 per cent) segments of society. 
Yet, the difference tends to be somewhat less pronounced among the richer group, especially 
in Gansu (by a factor 2.4 compared to a factor 3.7 when considering the fixed effects 
estimates). The richer also tend to rely less on loans to finance consumption, again, mostly so 
in Gansu.  
                                                 
24 The importance of the relative size of current unearned income in affecting its fungibility can also been seen 
when it is interacted with the ratio of current unearned income to permanent unearned income (Table A1). The 
larger is the ratio of current unearned income to permanent unearned income, the smaller is the MPC on 
unearned income and thus the more likely that it becomes fungible with earned income. The result is most 
manifest in Gansu, but also reveals itself on the investment side in Inner Mongolia through a lower dominance 
in the MPI from earned income when the ratio of unearned income to permanent unearned income increases (see 
Appendix A3 for details on the estimation strategy of MPI). 
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Second, to explore whether the core findings differ depending on the gender composition of 
the household, which may for example affect the propensity to keep different mental accounts 
of earned and unearned income ( ), the different income sources are interacted with the 
female-labour ratio within the household (Table 7). The effect of the gender composition of 
the household are subsequently tested at two points, the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the female 
labour ratio in each province. The proposition that the MPC from unearned income largely 
exceeds this of earned income holds for most of the household gender compositions observed 
in the sample.  
5.3 Can mental accounting by effort explain the breakdown in fungibility? 
The core finding that unearned income tends to be spent and earned income saved, and more 
so if the former is smaller than the latter and when it is transitory, is consistent with the 
mental accounting framework based on effort advanced in the theoretical section. Yet, how 
robust is it to alternative classifications and interpretations? First, education and housing 
durables could be seen as investment goods, and concerns could be raised about their 
inclusion in the consumption measure. Similarly, it could be argued that remittances from 
non-household members are really the results from former investments and efforts and are as 
such really earned instead of unearned, despite the long delay in receiving the returns to the 
efforts dispensed.25  As can be seen from Table 8, the findings are robust to the exclusion of 
these consumption and income categories. 
 
Second, could the PIH explain the findings? While it is possible that unearned income is 
largely transitory and earned income largely permanent, if so, PIH would imply that unearned 
income is largely saved, while earned income is largely spent. The FE and OLS results from 
this sample suggest the opposite, i.e. a larger MPC from unearned than from earned income. 
Going one step further, the analysis also jointly considered the transitory/permanent and 
earned/unearned nature of income. As predicted by the permanent income hypothesis, the 
marginal propensity to consume is larger from permanent than from transitory income, 
though this only holds when income is earned and not when income is unearned as predicted 
by the model in Section 2. Whether income is earned or unearned affects consumption/saving 
decisions beyond their permanent or transitory nature. 
 
Third, even though there are no indications to this effect in the data, it could be argued that the 
larger marginal propensity to immediately consume unearned income follows from the fact that 
it largely consists of transfers given  to compensate for (earned) income shocks. Yet, the FE 
estimates already control for covariant shocks through the time varying village level effects 
as well as for idiosyncratic shocks through the inclusion of the disability status of the 
household members (which changes over time). Moreover, if despite these controls, there 
was still such omitted variable bias based on the exclusion of idiosyncratic shocks, the 
current estimates of the MPC on unearned income are biased downward (shocks positively 
correlated with unearned income and negatively correlated with consumption (only partial 
smoothing)) and the current estimate of MPC on earned income would be biased upward 
(shocks were negatively correlated with earned income and negatively correlated with 
                                                 
25 Nonetheless, there are also good reasons to categorize it as unearned income.  The longer is the lag between 
effort and spending, the less likely the moment of consumption will call to mind the pain associated with the 
effort dispensed. As highlighted by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998), consumers prefer to decouple the moment 
of payment from the moment of consumption (e.g. through advance payment) so that consumption can be 
enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it, a phenomenon frequently exploited in various marketing 
arrangements such as flat-rate pricing and credit cards.  
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consumption). The current gap in MPC from unearned and earned income would thus in 
effect be a lower bound. Moreover, re-estimation removing relief funds from unearned 
incomes does not change the results. 
 
Fourth, when transfers are mostly going to the poorer households and the poor display greater 
impatience, the larger MPC on unearned income might simply reflect poverty as opposed to 
mental accounting by effort dispensed. Such omitted variable bias is highly unlikely, as the 
estimation already controls for the household‟s chronic and transitory poverty status through 
the inclusion of the household fixed effects together with additional controls for the asset 
holdings of the household in each period, its demographic characteristics as well as the time 
varying village dummies to capture time variant environmental characteristics that may 
further determine the household‟s poverty status. 
 
Finally, if unearned income tends to go disproportionately to one of the partners and if as a 
result, it changes the spending behaviour of the household (e.g. through a change in the 
bargaining balance), the higher MPC of unearned income might simply reflect intra-
household gender differences in saving behaviour. While most of the literature has focused 
on gender differences in contemporaneous spending across different goods (with women 
typically displaying a larger MPC for food than luxury or pleasure goods), as opposed to 
differences in the intertemporal allocation of income, gender differences in saving behaviour 
have been reported with women tending to have longer time horizons and being more patient 
(Browning 2000; Rubalcava et al. 2009). 
 
If unearned income would disproportionately go to women, this would however suggest that 
the MPC for unearned income should be lower, contrary to what is found in the data. On the 
other hand, if it would disproportionately go to men and strengthen their spending power in 
the household, the higher MPC from unearned income could in principle also reflect intra-
household differences in saving behaviour, as opposed to mental accounting. But are there 
any signs that unearned income disproportionately goes to one of the partners and that this 
affects household spending behaviour? To explore this further in the absence of any direct 
information about who received and administered the unearned income, the MPC on food and 
liquor and tobacco from unearned and earned income was estimated (Table A3). If reception 
of unearned income tipped the spending balance in favor of female (male) preferences, the 
literature predicts a higher (lower) MPC on food and a lower (higher) MPC on liquor and 
tobacco from unearned than from earned income. Yet, the results suggest a higher MPC from 
unearned income both for food and liquor/tobacco. A change in intra-household consumption 
behaviour depending on the (un)earned nature of income does not appear an overriding 
concern and the origin of income is likely to affect spending behaviour beyond any potential 
intra-household reallocations.26  
 
This review thus suggests that the observed tendency to consume more from unearned 
income and to save more from earned income isn‟t only compatible with consumption 
behaviour based on mental accounting by effort on theoretical and anecdotal/intuitive 
grounds, but that such an explanation is also empirically robust against a series of competing 
hypotheses.  
                                                 
26 Duflo and Udry (2004) also highlight the importance of the origin of income, beyond the gender of the 
income earner, in allocating income across different consumption goods in Cote d‟Ivoire.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
Behavioural economists are calling attention to consumption phenomena that violate the 
income fungibility assumption underpinning most economic modeling and policy advice. 
They argue that people code income in different mental accounts, establishing an explicit link 
between the source of income and spending behaviour. This paper has explored the existence 
of such accounts with respect to the effort dispensed in earning income both through 
theoretical modeling and empirical estimation. This potential link between spending and 
earning—more specifically the notion that there is pain/disutility in spending hard-earned 
money—has not received much conceptual or empirical attention in the economic literature 
despite longstanding and deeply embedded references across the world‟s cultures to the 
importance of such a link in understanding human spending behaviour. 
 
The empirical results, based on five-year household panel data from rural China support the 
notion that unearned income tends to be consumed more, while earned income tends to be 
saved, contradictory to the fungibility assumption, but consistent with the theoretical 
predictions derived from utility optimization with mental accounting depending on the origin 
of income. These tendencies are quantitatively significant with the MPC from unearned 
income three times larger than that from earned income, and more pronounced when 
unearned income is transitory and smaller than households‟ earned income. They are slightly 
less pronounced among the richer segments of the population, but largely robust to the gender 
composition of the household. Careful consideration of several competing hypotheses 
supports the psychologically grounded choice theory of mental accounting based on the 
(un)earned origin of income as a plausible contender to understand these observations.  
 
The findings bear on important ongoing policy debates both in western and southern 
economies such as the effectiveness of economic stimulus packages and the optimal 
modalities of safety nets (e.g. employment generating programmes or cash transfers) as well 
as aid programmes (loans or grants). The results also highlight the importance of the relative 
size of the transfer in relation to other income sources, with relatively small transfers more 
likely to be spent, and large ones more likely to be saved, an important insight, for example in 
considering the effects for consumer demand of extending tax cuts across the board, as in the 
US in 2010. The behavioural patterns observed here are obviously not the only consideration 
in determining the optimality of the different policy instruments. Nonetheless, mental 
accounting based on the effort dispensed in obtaining income emerges as a fruitful line of 
inquiry in examining consumption and saving behaviour in other contexts and settings and 
heeding the much ignored age-old saying „easy come, easy go‟ might be time well spent in 
future theoretical and empirical work. 
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Table 1: Income, consumption, investment and saving in Gansu (2000-04) 
Variables  N mean sd min median max 
Total income  3,500 6,360 3,907 0 5,598 87,533 
 Earned income 3,500 5,962 3,536 0 5,269 86,092 
  Wage income from migrants 3,500 827 1,483 0 0 17,480 
  Other wage income 3,500 513 1,185 0 0 12,955 
  Income from family business 3,500 4,623 3,332 0 3,930 86,092 
 Unearned income 3,500 363 1,705 0 34 79,858 
  Remittances 3,500 128 611 0 0 18,634 
  Gifts  3,500 95 638 0 0 19,980 
  Other transfers
1
 3,500 141 1,443 0 17 79,858 
   Survey subsidy  2,100 27 40 0 23 528 
   Relief funds 3,500 2 38 0 0 1,408 
   Insurance 2,100 0 3 0 0 113 
   Pension 3,500 19 313 0 0 8,977 
   Injury (death) compensation  1,400 59 2,135 0 0 79,858 
   Money for supporting the old  1,400 8 110 0 0 1,851 
   Reimbursement of medical cost 1,400 0 0 0 0 0 
   Tax refund 1,400 0 3 0 0 41 
   Forestry subsidy (Tuigenhuanlin) 1,400 17 97 0 0 1,516 
Total consumption 3,500 4,381 2,950 633 3,621 51,675 
  Food  3,500 2,337 1,435 404 2,116 50,809 
   Staple food
2
 3,500 1,208 1,095 0 1,076 50,430 
   Non-staple food 3,500 624 476 0 531 7,829 
  Entertainment 3,500 93 302 0 5 2,989 
  Education 3,500 396 1,101 0 92 15,179 
  Liquor  3,500 109 146 0 64 1,979 
  Tobacco 3,500 122 140 0 82 1,958 
  Money to non-residential family members 3,500 21 146 0 0 4,505 
  Gifts sent out 3,500 86 645 0 0 17,904 
  Other consumption 3,500 1,423 1,723 10 910 29,195 
   Clothing 3,500 203 193 0 153 2,623 
   Housing durables
3
 3,500 272 965 0 0 27,972 
   Housing non-durables 3,500 505 812 0 318 13,880 
   Medicine 3,500 223 702 0 74 18,143 
   Transportation 3,500 164 559 0 19 10,729 
Business and investment 3,500 1,282 1,735 0 873 24,998 
  Family business 3,500 1,128 1,253 0 844 24,710 
  Productive assets 3,500 154 1,006 0 0 22,523 
Taxes   3,500 148 189 0 111 5,631 
Loans   3,500 490 2,202 0 0 75,075 
Financial assets
4
 3,500   1,462 2,020 0 781 26,405 
Livestock 3,500   953 953 0 887 14,985 
Note: The unit is Yuan (1 Yuan is around US$0.12). All values are in 1999 price of Gansu. (1) While all items 
were recorded in all years, subclassification of survey subsidy and insurance was only available in 2000-02, and 
subclassification of the last five items of other transfers was only available in 2003-04. (2) Staple food includes 
grains, potatoes and beans. (3) Housing durables include materials for building and decorating houses, costs of 
purchasing houses, furniture and housing facilities. Housing non-durables include costs of electricity, water, fuel, 
and daily necessities. (4) Financial assets include deposit in banks, cash at home, bonds and stocks. 
Source: See text. 
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Table 2: Income, consumption, investment and saving in Inner Mongolia (2000-04) 
Variables  N mean sd Min median max 
Total income  4,000 9,716 5,972 357 8,626 70,047 
 Earned income 4,000 9,331 5,816 49 8,277 68,631 
  Wage income from migrants 4,000 328 1,146 0 0 17,349 
  Other wage income 4,000 669 1,429 0 0 12,687 
  Income from family business 4,000 8,334 5,676 0 7,308 68,631 
 Unearned income 4,000 329 990 0 64 22,444 
  Remittances 4,000 20 208 0 0 7,807 
  Gifts  4,000 119 834 0 0 22,388 
  Other transfers
1
 4,000 190 483 0 56 10,815 
   Survey subsidy  2,400 48 52 0 56 741 
   Relief funds 4,000 1 22 0 0 672 
   Insurance 2,400 0 0 0 0 0 
   Pension 4,000 0 2 0 0 136 
   Injury (death) compensation  1,600 0 4 0 0 153 
   Money for supporting the old  1,600 4 75 0 0 2,056 
   Reimbursement of medical cost 1,600 0 3 0 0 117 
   Tax refund 1,600 3 34 0 0 718 
   Forestry subsidy (Tuigenhuanlin) 1,600 94 278 0 0 3,186 
Total consumption 4,000 5,452 3,720 288 4,438 45,919 
  Food  4,000 2,297 885 105 2,171 8,817 
   Staple food
2
 4,000 838 402 0 787 4,438 
   Non-staple food 4,000 884 481 0 835 8,100 
  Entertainment 4,000 134 338 0 32 8,227 
  Education 4,000 630 1,329 0 154 13,713 
  Liquor  4,000 135 143 0 94 1,467 
  Tobacco 4,000 136 141 0 101 2,430 
  Money sent to non-residential family members 4,000 86 747 0 0 25,563 
  Gifts sent out 4,000 312 1,110 0 54 27,529 
  Other consumption 4,000 1,961 2,492 12 1,218 38,795 
   Clothing 4,000 346 342 0 265 5,016 
   Housing durables
3
 4,000 270 1,247 0 0 28,346 
   Housing non-durables 4,000 504 579 0 367 10,453 
   Medicine 4,000 327 999 0 92 21,465 
   Transportation 4,000 410 996 0 95 21,842 
Business and investment 4,000 4,090 4,414 0 2,836 62,242 
  Family business 4,000 3,415 3,264 0 2,580 58,057 
  Productive assets 4,000 673 2,679 0 0 45,008 
Taxes   4,000 349 482 0 201 7,964 
Loans   4,000 1,404 3,358 0 0 63,800 
Financial assets
4
 4,000 2,784 3,357 2 1703 33,646 
Livestock 4,000 1,285 3,948 0 694 61,763 
Note: The unit is Yuan (1 Yuan is around US$0.12). All values are in 1999 price of Inner Mongolia. (1) While all 
items were recorded in all years, subclassification of survey subsidy and insurance was only available in 2000-
02, and subclassification of the last five items of other transfers was only available in 2003-04. (2) Staple food 
includes grains, potatoes and beans. (3) Housing durables include materials for building and decorating houses, 
costs of purchasing houses, furniture and housing facilities. Housing non-durables include costs of electricity, 
water, fuel, and daily necessities. (4) Financial assets include deposit in banks, cash at home, bonds and stocks. 
Source: See text. 
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Table 3: Unearned income ranges from being negligible to being very important 
 Unearned income=0 Unearned income>0 
# obs. Average income 
(1999 yuan) 
# obs. Average income 
(1999 yuan) 
Unearned Earned Unearned Earned 
Gansu 
Unearned < Earned 1,241 0 5,624 2,208 413 6,224 
Unearned > Earned NA 0 NA 48 7,469 3,012 
Inner Mongolia 
Unearned < Earned 1,383 0 8,803 2,594 446 9,664 
Unearned > Earned NA 0 NA 23 6,923 3,597 
Source: See text. 
 
Table 4: Household characteristics of rural households in Gansu and Inner Mongolia 
variables explanation N
1
 mean sd min max 
Gansu 
Business household Dummy=1 if household is a business 
household; 0 if not 
3,500 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Rural cadres’ household Dummy=1 if household is a cadres’ 
household; 0 if not 
3,500 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Household size Size of the household 3,500 4.77 1.34 0 10 
Female labour ratio Female 16<=age<=60/household labour 3,500 0.48 0.15 0 1 
Dependency ratio (household size - member 
16<=age<=60)/member 16<=age<=60 
3,500 0.29 0.21 0 1 
Gender household head Dummy=1 if gender of household head is 
male; 0 if not 
3,497 1.00 0.06 0 1 
Age household head Age of household head 3,497 41.88 11.10 5 83 
Edu. level household head Years of education 3,486 6.85 3.66 0 16 
No. of disabled people No. of disabled people 16<=age<=60 3,500 0.07 0.29 0 3 
Inner Mongolia 
Business household Dummy=1 if household is a business 
household; 0 if not 
4,000 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Rural cadres’ household Dummy=1 if household is a cadres’ 
household; 0 if not 
4,000 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Household size Size of the household 4,000 3.72 0.98 1 8 
Female labour ratio Female 16<=age<=60/household labour 4,000 0.48 0.15 0 1 
Dependency ratio (household size - member 
16<=age<=60)/member 16<=age<=60 
4,000 0.22 0.20 0 1 
Gender household head Dummy:=1 if gender of household head is 
male; 0 if not 
3,995 0.99 0.09 0 1 
Age household head Age of household head 3,995 44.10 8.89 23 78 
Edu. level household head Years of education 3,995 8.25 2.50 0 16 
No. of disabled people No. of disabled people 16<=age<=60 4,000 0.08 0.40 0 4 
Note:
1
Based on all five survey rounds in 2000-04. The difference in the number of observations is due to missing 
values.  
Source: See text. 
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Table 5: MPC from unearned income larger than from earned income 
Consumption (exclusive gifts given) Gansu  Inner Mongolia 
 FE OLS PT  FE OLS PT 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel 1: Living expenditures (full sample)        
Unearned permanent income   0.473***    0.319**  
   (0.081)    (0.116) 
Unearned (transitory) income 0.436*** 0.465*** 0.471***  0.339*** 0.327*** 0.334*** 
 (0.076) (0.082) (0.081)  (0.070) (0.068) (0.075) 
Earned permanent income   0.390***    0.244*** 
   (0.035)    (0.025) 
Earned (transitory) income 0.155*** 0.252*** 0.146***  0.124*** 0.194*** 0.133*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.025) (0.019) (0.023) 
Loans 0.240*** 0.277*** 0.275***  0.197*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 
 (0.062) (0.075) (0.072)  (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
Unearned (permanent) = Earned (permanent)
 1)
 0.001 0.013 0.329  0.003 0.061 0.533 
Unearned transitory = Earned transitory  0.000    0.009 
R-squared 0.466 0.601 0.616  0.292 0.436 0.442 
N. of Obs. 2,788 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 3,196 
Panel 2: Living expenditures (exclusive observations with Unearned income >Earned income) 
Unearned permanent income   0.614***    0.459**  
   (0.091)    (0.156) 
Unearned (transitory) income 0.582*** 0.616*** 0.644***  0.545*** 0.473*** 0.493*** 
 (0.105) (0.092) (0.094)  (0.139) (0.133) (0.137) 
Earned permanent income   0.393***    0.242*** 
   (0.035)    (0.025) 
Earned (transitory) income 0.158*** 0.254*** 0.147***  0.121*** 0.192*** 0.130*** 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)  (0.025) (0.019) (0.023) 
Loans 0.236*** 0.273*** 0.270***  0.196*** 0.192*** 0.186*** 
 (0.061) (0.074) (0.071)  (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Unearned (permanent) = Earned (permanent)
 1
 0.000 0.000 0.021  0.003 0.038 0.176 
Unearned transitory = Earned transitory   0.000    0.009 
R-squared 0.470 0.604 0.620  0.295 0.436 0.442 
N. of Obs. 2,753 2,753 2,753  3,176 3,176 3,176 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equation (12), and variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. 
1
P-values from Wald test of equality of the coefficients. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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Table 6: Difference in MPCs between earned and unearned income smaller among the rich 
Living expenditures Gansu  Inner Mongolia 
 FE OLS  FE OLS 
Unearned income  0.401*** 0.340***  0.439**  0.400** 
 (0.101) (0.090)  (0.173) (0.157) 
Unearned income * top 25 
percentile 0.031 0.135  -0.119 -0.094 
 (0.124) (0.122)  (0.181) (0.163) 
Earned income  0.106* 0.194***  0.105*** 0.167*** 
 (0.056) (0.054)  (0.032) (0.026) 
Earned income * top 25 percentile 0.057** 0.062**  0.023 0.028* 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Loans  0.413** 0.467***  0.225*** 0.215*** 
 (0.127) (0.130)  (0.060) (0.060) 
Loans*top 25 percentiles -0.250* -0.276*  -0.076 -0.059 
 (0.134) (0.143)  (0.073) (0.075) 
Unearned = Earned
1
 0.002 0.071  0.056 0.143 
Unearned top 25p=Earned top 25p 0.005 0.034  0.007 0.113 
R-squared 0.483 0.613  0.295 0.437 
N. of obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equation (12), and variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. The 75
th
 percentile of income per capita is 1,677 Yuan and 3,378 Yuan in Gansu and Inner Mongolia 
respectively. 
1
P-values from Wald test of equality of the coefficients. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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Table 7: Gender composition of household does not affect differences in MPC from earned 
and unearned income 
Living expenditures Gansu Inner Mongolia 
 FE OLS  FE OLS 
Unearned income 0.485** 0.386**  0.684**  0.593** 
 (0.191) (0.190)  (0.225) (0.217) 
Unearned income*female labour ratio 
16<=age<=60 -0.108 0.151  -0.626*   -0.480 
 (0.376) (0.369)  (0.352) (0.344) 
Earned income 0.259** 0.295***  0.146**  0.163*** 
 (0.086) (0.069)  (0.061) (0.046) 
Earned income*female labour ratio 
16<=age<=60 -0.226 -0.094  -0.048 0.063 
 (0.162) (0.123)  (0.106) (0.085) 
Loans 0.033 0.161  0.197*   0.140 
 (0.157) (0.176)  (0.119) (0.111) 
Loans*female labour ratio 16<=age<=60 0.465 0.261  -0.003 0.109 
 (0.409) (0.460)  (0.233) (0.224) 
Ratio=p25: Unearned income=Earned income
1
 0.001 0.030  0.005 0.035 
Ratio=p75: Unearned income=Earned income 0.000 0.012  0.001 0.037 
R-squared 0.470 0.601  0.294 0.437 
N. of Obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equation (12), and variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. The 25
th 
and 75
th
 percentiles of female labour ratio in Gansu are 0.4 and 0.5 respectively. In Inner 
Mongolia they are 0.33 and 0.5 respectively. 
1
P-values from Wald test of equality of the coefficients. *, **, *** 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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Table 8: Results are robust to excluding housing durables and education from living 
expenditures and excluding remittances from unearned income  
Living expenditures Gansu Inner Mongolia 
 FE OLS  FE OLS 
Panel 1: Excluding housing durables and education from living expenditures 
Unearned income 0.235*** 0.247***  0.271*** 0.278*** 
 (0.051) (0.041)  (0.057) (0.054) 
Earned income 0.106** 0.160***  0.077*** 0.135*** 
 (0.047) (0.046)  (0.017) (0.013) 
Loans 0.128*** 0.138***  0.108*** 0.105*** 
 (0.035) (0.032)  (0.027) (0.026) 
Unearned income=Earned income
1)
 0.027 0.071  0.001 0.011 
R-squared 0.457 0.602  0.290 0.460 
N. of Obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
Panel 2: Excluding remittances from unearned income 
Unearned income  0.373*** 0.546***  0.338*** 0.324*** 
 (0.103) (0.127)  (0.072) (0.071) 
Earned income 0.151*** 0.247***  0.123*** 0.193*** 
 (0.041) (0.040)  (0.025) (0.019) 
Loans 0.241*** 0.276***  0.198*** 0.195*** 
 (0.062) (0.074)  (0.044) (0.043) 
Unearned income=Earned income
1
 0.036 0.020  0.005 0.077 
R-squared 0.446 0.594  0.292 0.435 
N. of Obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equation (12), and variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. 
1
P-values from Wald test of equality of the coefficients. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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Appendix A1: MPC from earned and unearned income when the spending constraint 
on unearned income binds in the first, but not the second period 
 
When the constraint only holds in the first period and not in the second (         ), 
such that   
    
   it can be derived from (5) that    
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. Unearned and earned income are not fungible in the first period, but they become 
fungible again in the second period. Substituting   
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Appendix 2 
Table A1: The larger the ratio between current and permanent unearned income, the more 
likely it is that unearned and earned income are fungible 
 Gansu  Inner Mongolia 
Living expenditures OLS FE  OLS FE 
Unearned income 0.839*** 0.961***  0.586* 0.639*   
 (0.167) (0.201)  (0.313) (0.372) 
Unearned income*Ratio -0.098** -0.119**  -0.073 -0.084 
 (0.041) (0.050)  (0.070) (0.081) 
Earned income 0.273*** 0.182***  0.201*** 0.130*** 
 (0.033) (0.033)  (0.020) (0.025) 
Earned income*Ratio -0.001 -0.002  -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Loans 0.432*** 0.353***  0.130** 0.125**  
 (0.106) (0.099)  (0.047) (0.046) 
Loans*Ratio -0.124** -0.090*  0.049 0.056*   
 (0.055) (0.048)  (0.032) (0.030) 
R-squared 0.615 0.480  0.440 0.302 
No. of obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
Family business and investment     
LUnearned income 0.118 0.110  0.437 0.660 
 (0.105) (0.196)  (0.297) (0.688) 
L.Unearned income*L.Ratio -0.001 -0.028  -0.069 -0.113 
 (0.026) (0.050)  (0.065) (0.143) 
L.Earned income 0.145*** 0.034  0.324*** 0.008 
 (0.040) (0.030)  (0.034) (0.058) 
L.Earned income*L.Ratio -0.021** -0.006  -0.028** -0.022*   
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.013) 
Loans 0.140* 0.188**  0.441*** 0.474*** 
 (0.072) (0.076)  (0.109) (0.113) 
Loans*Ratio 0.111** 0.088*  0.019 0.002 
 (0.057) (0.053)  (0.048) (0.043) 
R-squared 0.527 0.483  0.538 0.406 
No. of obs. 2,089 2,089  2,400 2,400 
Saving in financial assets      
Unearned income -0.221* -0.035  0.095 0.697 
 (0.131) (0.294)  (0.255) (0.509) 
Unearned income*Ratio 0.162** 0.137  -0.004 -0.119 
 (0.053) (0.085)  (0.063) (0.109) 
Earned income 0.137*** 0.193***  0.080*** 0.118*** 
 (0.032) (0.043)  (0.018) (0.032) 
Earned income*Ratio -0.013* -0.015*  -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009) 
Loans 0.034 0.054  -0.026 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.041)  (0.029) (0.038) 
Loans*Ratio -0.043* -0.059**  0.001 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.027)  (0.012) (0.016) 
R-squared 0.419 0.406  0.284 0.234 
No. of Obs. 2,089 2,089  2,400 2,400 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equation (12), and variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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Appendix A3 Marginal propensity to invest/save from unearned and earned income 
 
To test whether the spending behaviour on business and investment and saving in financial 
assets also depends on income sources, similar models as in (12) are estimated: 
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   (A2-2) 
The parameters 1β , 2β  and 3β  measure the marginal propensity to invest (MPI) from the two 
sources of income and credit respectively. Income is lagged and assets are lagged twice, as 
rural households incur most of their expenditure on family business and productive assets 
before the farming season at the beginning of the year. The parameters 1γ , 2γ  and 3γ  measure 
the marginal propensity to save (MPS) from the two sources of income and credit 
respectively. Savings vhtA  may depend on the household‟s initial savings 1-vhtA . Since 4γ is 
not the variable of interest in this paper and to mitigate the usual econometric issue of 
dynamic panel data models, 2-vhtA  is used to capture the impact of initial asset level 1-vhtA . To 
explore differences in the MPI/MPS of the permanent and transitory parts of unearned and 
earned income, the following equations were estimated. 
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The estimated results are in Table A2. 
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Table A2: Households tend to invest/save more from earned than from unearned income. 
 Gansu  Inner Mongolia 
 FE OLS PT  FE OLS PT 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Business and investment        
L.Unearned permanent income   0.064    0.048 
   (0.047)    (0.150) 
L.Unearned (transitory) income -0.042 0.039 0.039  0.008 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.040)  (0.071) (0.064) (0.077) 
L.Earned permanent income   0.259***    0.527*** 
   (0.049)    (0.053) 
L.Earned (transitory) income 0.004 0.095** -0.025  -0.032 0.284*** -0.023 
 (0.021) (0.043) (0.040)  (0.068) (0.031) (0.048) 
Loans 0.291*** 0.269*** 0.251***  0.478*** 0.471*** 0.425*** 
 (0.050) (0.054) (0.051)  (0.088) (0.082) (0.077) 
Unearned (permanent) = Earned (permanent)
1)
 0.357 0.318 0.003  0.714 0.000 0.005 
Unearned transitory = Earned transitory 0.245    0.851   
R-squared 0.465 0.502 0.542  0.402 0.533 0.601 
N. of Obs. 2,089 2,089 2,089  2,400 2,400 2,400 
Saving in financial assets        
Unearned permanent income   0.225*    -0.037 
   (0.120)    (0.125) 
Unearned (transitory) income 0.420** 0.279** 0.304**  0.125 0.063 0.098 
 (0.145) (0.129) (0.132)  (0.091) (0.081) (0.089) 
Earned permanent income   0.043    0.055**  
   (0.030)    (0.021) 
Earned (transitory) income 0.140** 0.104*** 0.150***  0.109*** 0.076*** 0.106*** 
 (0.043) (0.031) (0.043)  (0.029) (0.017) (0.023) 
Loans -0.015 -0.018 -0.019  -0.004 -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.029) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unearned (permanent) = Earned (permanent) 0.061 0.184 0.143  0.877 0.877 0.479 
Unearned transitory = Earned transitory 0.256    0.932   
R-squared 0.394 0.402 0.407  0.233 0.284 0.285 
N. of Obs. 2,089 2,089 2,089  2,400 2,400 2,400 
Panel 2: without observations with Unearned income > Earned income 
Business and investment        
L.Unearned permanent income   0.044    0.075 
   (0.091)    (0.180) 
L.Unearned (transitory) income 0.000 0.009 0.020  0.042 -0.009 0.030 
 (0.080) (0.094) (0.089)  (0.152) (0.140) (0.131) 
L.Earned permanent income   0.260***    0.528*** 
   (0.049)    (0.054) 
L.Earned (transitory) income 0.004 0.094** -0.027  -0.032 0.284*** -0.023 
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.040)  (0.069) (0.031) (0.048) 
Loans 0.290*** 0.270*** 0.252***  0.477*** 0.469*** 0.423*** 
 (0.050) (0.054) (0.051)  (0.087) (0.082) (0.076) 
Unearned (permanent) = Earned (permanent) 0.963 0.409 0.035  0.694 0.042 0.022 
Unearned transitory = Earned transitory   0.644    0.716 
R-squared 0.466 0.503 0.544  0.404 0.533 0.602 
N. of Obs. 2,058 2,058 2,058  2,382 2,382 2,382 
table continues… 
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Saving in financial assets        
Unearned permanent income   -0.043    -0.085 
   (0.080)    (0.135) 
Unearned (transitory) income 0.04 -0.014 -0.008  0.044 0.008 0.041 
 (0.123) (0.078) (0.081)  (0.140) (0.093) (0.103) 
Earned permanent income   0.047    0.058**  
   (0.030)    (0.021) 
Earned (transitory) income 0.143*** 0.106*** 0.150***  0.111*** 0.079*** 0.107*** 
 (0.042) (0.030) (0.042)  (0.029) (0.017) (0.023) 
Loans -0.013 -0.016 -0.017  -0.003 -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.030) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unearned (permanent) = Earned (permanent) 0.431 0.158 0.291  0.653 0.470 0.310 
Unearned transitory = Earned transitory   0.086    0.545 
R-squared 0.382 0.402 0.406  0.234 0.286 0.287 
N. of Obs. 2,067 2,067 2,067  2,387 2,387 2,387 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equations (A2:1-3), and the variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are 
shown in brackets. 
1
P-values from Wald test of equality of the coefficients. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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Table A3: Households spend more unearned income on both food and liquor/tobacco 
 Gansu  Inner Mongolia 
 OLS FE  OLS FE 
Food 
Unearned income 0.078*** 0.061***  0.114*** 0.105*** 
 (0.016) (0.018)  (0.027) (0.026) 
Earned income 0.049*** 0.004  0.046*** 0.026*** 
 (0.013) (0.010)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Loans 0.023*** 0.017**  0.007 0.009*   
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Unearned income=Earned income
1)
 0.108 0.002  0.013 0.003 
R-squared 0.689 0.582  0.542 0.384 
N. of Obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
 
Liquor/tobacco 
Unearned income (excluding remittances) 0.023** 0.017***  0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.008) (0.005)  (0.013) (0.011) 
Earned income 0.011** 0.004*  0.009*** 0.006*** 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Loans 0.009*** 0.008***  0.002* 0.003*   
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Unearned income=Earned income
1
 0.128 0.010  0.001 0.000 
R-squared 0.528 0.332  0.341 0.249 
N. of Obs. 2,788 2,788  3,196 3,196 
Note: Time varying village dummies are included in all regressions. Financial assets, livestock as specified in 
equation (12), and variables in Table 4 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in 
brackets. 1) P-values from Wald test of equality of the coefficients. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
Source: See text. 
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